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Education and Marriage Decisions
of Japanese Women and the Role of
the Equal Employment Opportunity Act
Linda N. Edwards





The Japanese Equal Employment Opportunity Act (EEOA) of 1985 aimed to re-
duce gender discrimination in the labor market, especially for career-oriented
jobs. This paper investigates whether this act had an unanticipated effect on wom-
en’s marriage decisions. Usingmicro data from the Japanese Panel Survey of Con-
sumers, we model women’s interrelated decisions on university education and
whether tomarry, focusing onwhether womenhavemarriedby age 32.Our results
show a negative relationship between university education and marriage that is
much greater for post-EEOA cohorts of women than for pre-EEOA cohorts, con-
sistent with ourhypothesis that the enhanced career opportunities associatedwith
the EEOA stimulated women to delay or forgo marriage.
I. Introduction
The striking decline in Japanese birth rates over past 30 years has prompted
national concern, with fertility rates well below the population replacement
rate (Faruqee and Mühleisen 2001; Japan Ministry of Health, Labour and
Welfare 2015).1 The resulting shrinking population means that in the fu-
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1 The total fertility rate reached its lowest point, at 1.26, in 2005, and though it has risen
to 1.42 in 2014, it is still well below the population replacement rate ( Japan Ministry of
Health, Labour and Welfare 2015).
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ture, the country’s old-age dependency ratio will increase as the large post-
war baby boom and baby boom echo cohorts are supported by subsequent,
smaller cohorts.2 Coincident with this decline in birth rates has been a de-
cline in marriage rates (Sakamoto and Kitamura 2007) and a rise in the
mean age at first marriage ( Japan Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare
2015), both of which are linked directly by fertility researchers to the de-
cline in birth rates.3 Over the same period, with the passage of the Equal
EmploymentOpportunity Act (EEOA) in 1985 and subsequent supporting
legislation, career opportunities available to women have expanded, espe-
cially for women with a university education.
The goal of this paper is to investigate the possible role of the passage of
the EEOA in explaining the delay and decline in women’s marriage, both
directly and through the link of higher education. Existing literature has
documented the increased proportion of women who get a university ed-
ucation over this period and has suggested that the EEOAmay have played
a role in this increase (Edwards and Pasquale 2003; Abe 2011). At the same
time, the large economic and demographic literature on the determinants
of women’s marriage propensity and timing underscores the role of edu-
cational attainment in marriage decisions, with university-educated women
more likely than others to delay marriage (e.g., Raymo 2003). To our
knowledge, only one paper (Abe 2011) addresses the possibility that the
passage of the EEOA could be a factor in women’s marriage decisions,
but that paper does not explicitly test this proposition. In our paper, we ad-
dress this void by investigating whether the EEOA affected women’s mar-
riage decisions either directly or via their decisions to pursue university ed-
ucation. Our model treats education and marriage decisions as jointly
determined—something that has not been done in previous research on
Japanese women—and is estimated with data from the Japanese Panel Sur-
vey on Consumers ( JPSC).
Focusing on the likelihood that women marry by age 32, our research
provides strong support for the proposition that the passage of the EEOA
played a role in the delay and decline of marriage. Specifically, even when
we take explicit account of the effect of unmeasured personal attributes
on education and marriage decisions, we find that the deterrent effect
of university education on marriage is substantially larger for post-EEOA
cohorts of women, as compared to pre-EEOAcohorts. University-educated
2 The ratio of those aged 65 and above to the working-age population (aged 20–64 years)
is estimated to rise from 27 percent in 2000 to 47 percent in 2025, higher than estimated for
other low-birth-rate counties such as France and Italy (Faruqee and Mühleisen 2001, their
table 1).
3 As many researchers have noted (e.g., Hashimoto and Kondo 2012), because the aver-
age number of children borne by a married couple has stayed relatively constant since the
1970s and the percent of births that take place outside of marriage is very small (less than
2 percent in 2003), it is the decline in themarriage rate of women that accounts for the over-
all decline in fertility. See also Narayan and Peng (2007). For a general review of models of
marriage and childbirth, see Ermisch (2003) and Brien and Sheran (2003).
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women in post-EEOA cohorts are as much as 27 percentage points less
likely than their less educated contemporaries to be married by age 32,
whereas for pre-EEOA cohorts the correspondingdecline is atmost 13 per-
centage points. On the other hand, we find that the decision to obtain a
university education is primarily determined by a young woman’s ability
and ahost of family background characteristics, with theEEOAnot playing
a significant role. Overall, our findings indicate that for those seeking to
understand the declines over the past 30 years in marriage and fertility
in Japan, it is important to take into account the role played by the EEOA.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we briefly describe the
EEOAand review selected recent research on the relationships among ed-
ucation, marriage, and the EEOA. In Section III, we sketch out amodel of
joint decision-making with regard to education and marriage and de-
scribe its econometric implementation. Section IV describes the JPSC
data, followed by Section V, which provides estimates of our econometric
model. Section VI summarizes our conclusions.
II. Background and Related Research
The trends that prompt our research and that ofmany others are illustrated
in figure 1. Shown in this figure are data from 1970 to recent years for the
total fertility rate, the percent of women aged 30–34 not married, the per-
cent of female high school graduates who advance to university, and, for
comparison, thepercent ofmale high school graduates who advance to uni-
versity. Throughout this period there has been a dramatic decline in the to-
tal fertility rate, which, while increasing slightly since its nadir in 2005, still
remains well below the replacement rate. At the same time, the percent of
women aged 30–34 who remain unmarried has steadily increased, fromun-
der 10 percent in 1970 to almost 35 percent in 2010.4 Roughly parallel with
this rise in the proportion unmarried is the increase in young women’s ad-
vancement rate to university, growing from under 10 percent in 1970 to
over 45 percent in 2010. It is noticeable that the slopes of both of these
growth curves become steeper after 1985, the year in which the EEOA was
enacted by the Japanese legislature. The advancement rate to university
of youngmen also increased over the entire period, though less uniformly
than that of women, but the difference between the advancement rates of
men and women shrinks noticeably after 1985.
These concordant trends suggest the following set of hypotheses,
which we investigate in this paper. (1) The passage of the EEOA, by ex-
panding career opportunities of university-educated women, increased
the proportion of qualified women who follow this educational path. (2) The
4 Young women’s mean age at first marriage has also been increasing over this period,
from 24.2 in 1970, to 28.8 in 2010, to 29.3 in 2013 (JapanMinistry of Health, Labour andWel-
fare 2015).

































































































































































































expanded career opportunities associated with university education influ-
ence women’s marriage decisions, leading them to delay or decline mar-
riage. (3) The passage of the EEOA (and subsequent supporting legisla-
tion), which changed the legal and cultural landscape tomake a career path
more socially and economically attractive to women, increased the “deter-
rent” effect of university education on marriage.
To explore these hypotheses, we develop and estimate a multivariate
model of the relationship between Japanese women’s education and mar-
riagedecisions and the roleof theEEOA in thesedecisions.5 Whilenoother
studies directly address this set of hypotheses, a number of papers that ex-
amine some of the relevant relationships inform our research. They are
reviewed in the subsections below.
A. The 1985 EEOA and Subsequent Supporting Legislation
The EEOAwas enacted in 1985 and went into effect in April 1986.6 Before
1985, the primary Japanese legislation that treated women’s position in
the labor market was the 1947 Labor Standards Law, which prohibited
gender-basedwagediscrimination. Japan, as a signatory of the 1980United
Nations Convention Concerning the Elimination of All Forms of Discrim-
ination against Women, sought to expand its legislation with regard to
women in the labormarket in order tomeet the commitments in this con-
vention. The 1985 EEOA was the result: it prohibited gender discrimina-
tionwith respect to vocational training, fringebenefits, dismissal, andman-
datory retirement by reason ofmarriage, pregnancy, or childbirth. The act
also stated that firms have a “duty to endeavor” to equalize opportunity with
regard to recruitment, hiring, job assignment, and promotion, though
there were no prohibitions in these important areas. The Japanese gov-
ernment provided administrative guidance to firms to help them meet
this duty, but there was no private right to legal actionwith regard to these
areas of unequal treatment.7 Even with these drawbacks, however, the
EEOA of 1985 was enthusiastically welcomed by Japanese women as
epoch-making legislation. Especially for university-educated women, it
5 Models like the one we use in this paper owe a great debt to the seminal work of Gary
Becker onhuman capital, marriage, and the economics of the family (see, e.g., Becker 1976,
1993).
6 This subsection relies heavily on Araki (1998), which provides a good review (in En-
glish) of the 1985 EEOA as well as the 1997 legislation (which went into effect in 1999) that
substantially strengthened the original law. Yamada (2013) also summarizes these two laws
and provides a description of the subsequent law, which further expanded on the original
EEOA. In earlier literature, the EEOA was referred to as the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Law, or EEOL, as opposed to the EEOA, but EEOA is a more apt translation of the Jap-
anese title for this law. With regard to legislation covering leaves for child and elder care,
Japan Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (2010) is a good reference.
7 Government oversight in the form of “administrative guidance” is muchmore effective
in the Japanese context than it would be in an American context; indeed, some argue that it
is a “means more effective than criminal or civil sanctions in the Japanese social context”
(Araki 1998, 11).
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was expected to expand labor market opportunities, making “career” po-
sitions more available to them in an era when most women had been re-
quired by their employers to leave their jobs upon marriage or childbirth
regardless of their educational level.
In order to strengthen the 1985 Act, the Japanese legislature revised it
two times, in 1997 and 2003. The amendment to the EEOAof 1997 prohib-
ited discrimination in hiring and promotion, and the amendment of 2003
prohibited discrimination against males. The amendment of 2003 also in-
cluded aprohibitionof implicit discrimination. This proscriptionwas intro-
duced in response to the fact that after the original EEOA went into effect,
many larger firms adopted a dual-career-path system to steer women away
from traditional career positions (Hamaguchi 2011). Other important leg-
islation related to the EEOA is the 1991 Child Care and Family Care Leave
Act, which was strengthened in 1995 and 1999. It mandates that employers
give parental leave to any mother whose child is under the age of one.
B. The EEOA–Labor Market Link
The hypotheses we explore are based on the proposition that the EEOA
expanded career opportunities for university-educated women. Three
recent papers by Abe (2010, 2011, 2013) investigate this proposition by
looking at effects of the EEOA on women’s earnings and employment.
Abe (2010) examines the impact of the EEOA on the gender wage gap,
using cohort data from theBasic Survey ofWage Structure at 5-year intervals
from 1975 to 2005. Focusing on full-time workers only, she shows that while
the overall female-to-male full-time wage gap decreased over this period,
this decrease was mainly attributable to an increase in the educational at-
tainment of the full-time female labor force; for university-educatedwomen,
the female-to-male wage gap narrowed very little for post-EEOA cohorts.
The gender wage gap within educational categories may not have been
much affected by the EEOA, but what about women’s employment? The
relationship between the EEOA and women’s labor force behavior over
the life cycle is the focus of Abe (2011). Using data from the Japanese Em-
ployment Status Survey (Shugyo Kozo Kihon Chosa) from 1998 to 2007, this
paper examines how the EEOA affected women’s full- and part-time
employment patterns both by marital status and by level of educational
attainment. Using a methodology that compares cohorts of women who
entered the labor market after the EEOA went into effect with earlier,
pre-EEOA, cohorts, Abe finds that the employment rate in full-time posi-
tions increased after the EEOA only for university graduates. Taking the
analysis further, Abedecomposed changes in full-time employment of this
group bymarital status, since unmarried women typically have higher em-
ployment rates than married women. She finds that the full-time employ-
ment rate did not increase for either married or unmarried university-
educated women but rather that the proportion of these highly educated
women who remained unmarried had increased.
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Abe (2013) explores the possibility that the EEOA may have had dif-
ferent impacts across the various Japanese regions and concludes that such
differences do exist: the post-EEOA increase in employment rates of
university-educated women documented in her earlier research was most
evident in the Tokyo area, most likely because that is where there is the
greatest availability of managerial positions.
Taken together, these three studies suggest that the benefits to Japanese
women of the career opportunities enabled by the EEOA were to be ob-
tainedmainly by investing in university education andworking (especially
in Tokyo) a full-time rather than a part-time schedule, the latter of which
was facilitated by delaying or decliningmarriage. Abe’s findings are based
on a model that does not allow for the explicit possibility that marriage
rates and educational attainment are themselves affected by the EEOA,
but she recognizes these links in her conclusion: “Since the enactment
of the [EEOA], more women with university education have married late
or stayed unmarried” (Abe 2011, 52).
C. Higher Education and the EEOA
The role of the EEOA in young women’s decisions with regard to post–
high school education is addressed in Edwards and Pasquale (2003). Us-
ing micro data from the first wave of the JPSC, Edwards and Pasquale’s
analysis holds constant family background, demographic factors, and eco-
nomic conditions in estimating the effect of the passage of the EEOA on
the higher-education decisions of young Japanese women. Their model
does a good job of explaining higher-education decisions, but the results
with regard to the effect of theEEOAare not robust, possibly because only
two cohorts in the survey had made educational decisions after the pas-
sage of the law. Nonetheless, their research provides suggestive evidence
that the passage of the law was associated with an increased propensity of
young women to choose university education over junior college.
D. Marriage
There is an extensive economic and demographic literature on women’s
marriage rates in Japan,much of it focusing on explaining the secular de-
clines illustrated in figure 1. To our knowledge, none of this literature
explicitly addresses the possible role of the EEOA in contributing to this
decline, but a variety of other explanations have been explored. Some
studies focus on the role of labor market conditions, including unem-
ployment rates of men, women, or both (e.g., Higuchi 2001; Miyoshi
2014; Hashimoto and Kondo 2012). Other studies focus on the role of
the women’s own earnings and income (e.g., Higuchi 2001; Sakai 2009).
Still others focus on the increasing levels of women’s educational attain-
ment and the resulting reduced relative availability of potential spouses
with the requisite level of education, dubbed the “marriage mismatch” hy-
pothesis (e.g., Raymo 2003; Raymo and Iwasawa 2005). Other studies tar-
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get increased income or other transfers (e.g., housing) from parents to
daughters as a potential explanation—dubbed the “parasite single” hy-
pothesis (Sakamoto and Kitamura 2007).
These studies examine different hypotheses and use different data sets,
but they have one common feature: all find that a woman’s educational at-
tainment is an important correlate of whether and when she marries. Spe-
cifically, all of these studies report that women with a university education
are more likely to delay marriage.8 With regard to the question of whether
this delay translates into a lower overall likelihood that university-educated
women marry, the studies are not definitive. Results differ, depending on
the set of explanatory variables held constant in the analyses: for example,
Raymo (2003) estimates a set of alternative models that yield contrasting
results on this point.
Other factors that have been found to be statistically significant in one
ormore of these studies are the woman’s age;measures that represent var-
ious aspects of the labor market for both men and women, including the
woman’s own income; measures that represent socioeconomic character-
istics of her parents, including their income, health, and work status;mea-
sures that reflect income or other transfers from her parents, including
housing; characteristics of the woman’s natal family; demographic mea-
sures that reflect the availability of potential spouses; and the region in
which she lives and its rural/urban characteristics.
III. A Model of Joint Education and Marriage Decisions
Pulling together the findings cited above, we see that the EEOA is likely to
have positively affected the probability that women attend university, that
university-educated women are more likely than other women to be em-
ployed in full-time positions and to delay marriage, and that a woman’s de-
cision to marry is empirically related to her level of education, her family
background, her earnings and income, and labor market conditions at
the time of her graduation and thereafter. The papers on marriage refer-
enced abovedonot incorporate the possibility thatmarriage andeducation
are jointly determined, nor do they consider the possibility that the EEOA
might be related to marriage decisions. The model described below incor-
porates these innovations.
A. The Japanese Context
Japanesewomen typically choose between two types of post–high school ed-
ucation—university and junior college—but it is university education that
8 Even though university-educated women delay marriage while in school, they catch up
to some extent later—the difference in mean age at marriage between university graduates
and high school graduates is substantially less than 4 years (see Shirahase 2000, especially
table 1).
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provides the background for a career.9 Junior college curricula are typically
limited, and three-quarters of them “offer a single curriculum in nonvoca-
tional subjects, such as music, home economics, and English literature”
(Ishida 1998, 288). Junior college education is likely to be better prepara-
tion for marriage than for career employment, and the financial returns
from a junior college education may run predominantly through the mar-
riage market, as compared to the labor market. University education, in
contrast, offers a curriculum that provides superior preparation for career
employment, though it, too, may improve a young woman’s marriage pros-
pects.10 The education decision we focus on, therefore, is the decision to
attend or not attend university.
A distinguishing feature of Japanese higher education is that, unlike
the United States, where people leave and reenter post–high school edu-
cational institutions at various points in life, education in Japan is more
structured; few women are in any type of formal schooling after marriage.
In addition, the path to university education is well defined, so that with-
out proper preparation in the high school years, a Japanese student can-
not expect to enter university.11 These features provide the setting within
which education decisions are made in Japan.
B. The Economic Model
Themodel we sketch out below captures in stylized form this context and is
similar in spirit to the model outlined by Lefgren and McIntyre (2006).
They posit a two-period model in which a woman’s education decision is
made in the first period and her marriage decision is made in the second
period.12 They also postulate that a woman’s education does not directly
affect her “draw” in the marriage market, but because higher education
9 Other post–high school options are colleges of technology and specialized training col-
leges, which provide a wide variety of vocational and practical skills but are not typically con-
sidered to be comparable to university, though in some cases they may be comparable to
junior colleges.
10 In the context of the United States, Goldin (1992), Lefgren and McIntyre (2006), Ge
(2011), and others have shown that a large part of the returns to university education is via
the marriagemarket: by attending university, young women come in contact with highly ed-
ucated youngmen, who will have greater future earning power. For example, doing a “back-
of-the-envelope” computation, Lefgren and McIntyre estimate that about half of the in-
crease in a woman’s “available income” (including income that she receives through her
marriage) associated with her own higher education comes through the marriage market.
11 This characterization of access to university education is appropriate for the time the
women in this sample were attending university, but more recently there have been changes.
For example, in 1997 only 5 percent of private universities fell below their enrollment limits,
but by 2008 the situation had changed dramatically, with 47 percent of private universities fall-
ing below their enrollment limits. As a result, more universities are now enrolling students
with lower test scores thanwould havebeen acceptable in the past; suchuniversities havebeen
dubbed “free-pass” universities by the Japanese media. For a detailed discussion of recent
changes in Japanese higher education, see Igami (2014).
12 Lefgren andMcIntyre (2006) apply this two-periodmodel to data for theUnited States,
but themodel is more appropriate for Japan than it is for theUnited States, where it is not at
all uncommon for people to enter and/or reenter university after marriage or after having
had children.
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is associatedwith higher earnings, her education does affect whether or not
a particular draw from the distribution of potential husbandswill be accept-
able toher. The higherher own level of education, the fewer the number of
men acceptable to her as a potential spouse. In thismodel, the resulting re-
lationship between educational attainment andmarriage canbe positive or
negative, depending on whether a woman’s higher level of education has a
stronger effect on her own earnings or on her share of her husband’s earn-
ings.13 Lefgren and McIntyre also show, as we do below, that a woman’s ed-
ucational choice is related to her futuremarriage expectations and that not
taking into account this potential endogeneity can lead to biased coeffi-
cients of the education variable in a marriage equation.
While our model is inspired by Lefgren and McIntyre (2006), it differs
because we focus on tracing the effects of the EEOA on the interrelated de-
cisions regarding education and marriage rather than on measuring the
economic status of women before and after marriage. We assume that a
young woman’s (and her family’s) decision with regard to whether she will
get a university education is well defined by the time she is near the end
of high school—at age 17 (this age corresponds to period 1 in Lefgren-
McIntyre model). Variables that affect this decision would include family
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, the expected costs and re-
turns to a university education, and unmeasured ability and taste factors
that reflect a young woman’s desire for career employment and marriage.
Themarriage decision is assumed to take place after her education is com-
pleted (this corresponds to period 2 in the Lefgren-McIntyremodel) and is
determined by the young woman’s educational attainment (which, in line
with Lefgren and McIntyre, will affect her financial returns to marriage),
her family background, various indicators of the state of the marriage
and labor markets, and unmeasured taste and cultural factors that influ-
ence both her career aspirations and her judgment about the desirability
of marriage.
C. Econometric Implementation
1. The Basic Model
The features described above are best captured by a recursive bivariate
probit statistical model, represented mathematically below and estimated
through maximum likelihood methods (see Greene 2008, 823–26, for a
discussion of this model). For i 5 1,… ,N ,
Ei 5 1 aeAi 1 xe,i
0be 1 εe,i > 0ð Þ, (1)
Mi 5 1 gEi 1 amAi 1 vðEi  AiÞ 1 xm,i 0bm 1 εm,i > 0ð Þ, (2)
13 Another paper that looks at the interrelationship between education and marriage deci-
sions in the United States, Ge (2011), focuses on the increased financial gains from marriage
obtainable by attending college (because of the better set of potential spouses from which to
choose) and reports that the expected financial gains frommarriage are a significant determi-
nant of a woman’s decision to attend college.
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where 1(⋅) is an indicator function,14 and the error terms are assumed to













In this system of equations, the dichotomous variable Ei represents
whether or not a young woman i completed university, andMi represents
whether or not she has been married by the age of 32.15 The factors that
affect the education decision, denoted xe, are similar to those in Edwards
and Pasquale (2003), while the error term εe picks up unmeasured ability,
taste for education, taste for marriage, and taste for career employment,
all as of the time the young woman is making her higher-education deci-
sion. The factors that affect the marriage decision, denoted xm, follow
closely themarriage literature cited earlier, while the random error term,
εm, picks up various luck factors that determine amarriagematch and also
the young woman’s unobservable tastes for career employment and mar-
riage at the time of completing her education. The variables in xe and xm,
which have some common elements, are described in detail in the next
section. The dichotomous variable Ai, appearing in both equations, indi-
cates whether a young woman’s education decision was made before or
after the passage of the EEOA.
There are three aspects of our econometric model that should be high-
lighted. First, there is a potential correlation between the error terms in
the education and marriage equations (r ≠ 0) because they both include
components that represent unmeasured tastes for marriage and career em-
ployment. Such a correlation implies that educational attainment is an en-
dogenous variable in the marriage equation (CovðM , εmÞ ≠ 0). Indeed, in-
cluding the education variable, which is the dependent variable in the first
equation, in the marriage equation (eq. [2]) as an explanatory variable is
what distinguishes this statisticalmodel from a nonrecursivemodel. Greene
(2008, 823) notes, however, that in models such as this one, the endoge-
nous nature of education variable in themarriage equation “can be ignored
in formulating the log-likelihood.” Hence, we are able to treat the educa-
tion variable E in the marriage equation (eq. [2]) as if it were exogenous
by jointly estimating equations (1) and (2) and allowing for a correlation,
r, between the error terms.
14 Like Lefgren and McIntyre (2006), we posit the relationships in eqq. (1) and (2) in the
formof regression equations. In anappendix, they sketchouthow regression equations such as
these could be derived, with a set of appropriate simplifying assumptions, from a utility maxi-
mization framework. Note also that the first equation in the system is similar to the estimating
equation in Edwards and Pasquale (2003), which is derived from a random-utility model.
15 In this paper, since we are focusing on the marriage decision, we define our marriage
variable to include anyone who, at the point when we observe her, had decided to become
married, whether or not thatmarriage ended indivorce. Note that divorce is relatively rare in
Japan, at about 2 per 1,000 population in 2010 (Japan Ministry of Health, Labour and Wel-
fare 2015). In the JPSC data, approximately 1.0 percent of the previouslymarried women get
divorced every year.
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Second, our model is identified. In theory, the functional form is suffi-
cient to identify the bivariate probit model without imposing any exclusion
restrictions (Wilde 2000). However, it is still desirable to impose such re-
strictions because doing so increases the accuracy of parameter estimates.
In our case, what is required is that at least one variable in the education
equation (eq. [1]) be excluded from the marriage equation (eq. [2]). As
shown in the next section, our model satisfies this restriction.
Third, we include an interaction term between the education variable
and the EEOA variable in the marriage equation (eq. [2]) in order to test
our hypothesis that the “deterrent” effect of university education on mar-
riage increased after the passage of the EEOA. Including this interaction
term alsomakes it possible to interpret ourmodel as a variant of thewidely
used “difference-in-differences” design.
2. Computation of Partial Effects
Estimation of themodel in equations (1) and (2) yields probit coefficients.
These coefficients provide insight into the sign and significance of the re-
lationship among education, marriage, and the EEOA, as well as the other
explanatory variables in the above equations, but are not readily interpret-
able in terms of economic or social impact. To see which variables would
be of meaningful consequence to decision-making, we compute partial
effects, as described below.
The partial effects of the explanatory variables in the education equation
can be computed in the same way as those in a usual probit model, since
EðE ∣ A, xeÞ 5 FðaeA 1 xe 0beÞ. That is, because of the model’s recursive
structure, there is no impact of xm on the education decision; only the var-
iables xe directly affect the education decision. For discrete variables such
as A, we compute the partial effects by using the finite-difference method:
EðE ∣ A 5 1, xeÞ 2 EðE ∣ A 5 0, xeÞ. For continuous variables, we com-
pute the partial effects by using the calculus method: yEðEi ∣ xeÞ=yxe.
Computing partial effects in themarriage equation ismore complicated.
Consider first one of ourmain interests: the impact of the education on the
marriage decision. This can be computed as
EðM ∣ E 5 1, A, xmÞ 2 EðM ∣ E 5 0, A, xmÞ
5 Fðg 1 ðv 1 amÞA 1 xm 0bmÞ 2 FðamA 1 xm 0bmÞ: (3)
This partial effect measures the overall impact of the education variable,
averaging the pre-EEOA and post-EEOA cohorts. To see how this partial
effect differs between the pre-EEOA and post-EEOA cohorts, we also
compute separate partial effects for these two cohort groups. The pre-
EEOA education partial effect is EðM ∣ E 5 1, A 5 0, xmÞ2EðM ∣ E 5 0,
A 5 0, xmÞ, and the post-EEOA education partial effect is computed as
EðM ∣ E 5 1, A 5 1, xmÞ 2 EðM ∣ E 5 0, A 5 1, xmÞ.
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In the case of other explanatory variables in themodel, they can have di-
rect and/or indirect impacts on the marriage decision, depending on
whether they appear in the marriage equation, the education equation,
or both. Direct partial effects are the impacts on the marriage decision of
the explanatory variables that appear in the marriage equation (xm). The
signs of the direct effects are the same as the signs of the probit coefficients
in the marriage equation (eq. [2]). Indirect partial effects are the impacts
on themarriage decision of explanatory variables from the education equa-
tion (xe) and operate through the education decision. Given the expected
negative impact of education on the marriage decision, the signs of the in-
direct partial effects are opposite to the signs of the corresponding coeffi-
cients in the education equation. If a variable appears in both themarriage
and education equations, it has both direct and indirect effects; the sum of
these is reported as the “total” effect.16
IV. Data and Variables
The data used to estimate our model come from a unique micro-level
panel survey called the JPSC, a nationwide longitudinal survey of young
Japanese women and their husbands sponsored by the Institute for Re-
search on Household Economics (Kakei Keizai Kenkyujo) in Japan. These
data are especially suitable for our study because they provide a rich set of
information about women’s family background, education, and mar-
riage. The first wave (wave A) of this survey was conducted in 1993 and
16 Specifically, under the assumption of bivariate normality, the expected value of M
(conditional on exogenous explanatory variables) can be written as
EðM Þ 5 F2ðamA 1 xm 0bm,2aeA 2 xe 0be;2rÞ 1 F2 g 1 ðv 1 amÞA 1 xm 0bm, aeA 1 xe 0be; rð Þ,
where F2ð, ; rÞ is the cumulative distribution function of the bivariate normal distribution
with the coefficient of correlation r. For discrete variables, we compute the partial effects by
using the finite-difference method. We evaluate the expected value E(M) at the relevant val-
ues of xm for the direct effect and xe for the indirect effect. For continuous variables, we com-
pute the partial effects via the calculus method by taking partial derivatives. The direct ef-
fect on the marriage decision is
yEðM Þ
yxm
5 fðamA 1 xm 0bmÞ  F 2aeA 2 xe




1 f g1 ðv1amÞA1xm 0bmð ÞF 2aeA2xe






The indirect effect is
yEðM Þ
yxe
5 fðaeA 1 xe 0beÞ  F g 1 ðv 1 amÞA 1 xm










See Greene (1998) and Hasebe (2013) for a detailed discussion of partial effects in the bi-
variate probit model.
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included 1,500 randomly selected women aged 24–34 in that year.17 Sub-
sequent waves (B and C) were added to the sample in 1997 and 2003:
wave B included 500 women aged between 24 and 27 years in 1997, and
wave C included 836 women aged between 24 and 29 years in 2003. As
of 2008, there remained 1,648 respondents aged between 29 and 49 in
the JPSC.
The structure of the data set is illustrated in figure 2. Each row in the fig-
ure corresponds to a year and shows the number of women of each age for
whom data are reported for that year. For example, in 1993, the first survey
year of wave A, there were 151 women aged 24, 161 aged 25, and so on, for a
total of 1,500women aged24–34 in that year. In the following year, 1994, the
women have aged one year, and there is some attrition, so that there are no
women aged 24, 145 aged 25 (six women from that age cohort had dropped
out of the survey over the year), 146 aged 26, and so on, for a total of 1,415
women aged 25–35 in that year (total attrition was 85). Things continue in a
similar fashion in1995 and1996.WaveBbegins in 1997, with anewgroupof
24–27-year-old women added to the survey, and wave C begins in 2003, with
an additional group of women aged 24–29 added in that year. The potential
number of women for whom we would have family background and educa-
tion information—both of which come from the questionnaire adminis-
tered in the initial survey year for each wave—is 2,836. However, because
we are studying marital status as of age 32, the three cohorts that have not
yet reached that age during our study must be excluded from our analysis,
yielding a maximum number of 2,422 potential observations. When obser-
vations withmissing data on any of the family background or education var-
iables are removed, our actual working sample becomes 2,224 women.
Looking at figure 2 in a slightly different way, one can see that each col-
umn shows the number of observations available for women of a specified
age but at different points in calendar time. For example, if one wanted to
study women at age 32, there would be 122 of them observed in 1993, 124
observed in 1994, and so on, for a total of 1,641 women in the sample who
responded to the survey at age 32. Also indicated in this figure is whether
women of a particular age in a particular year are members of the pre-
EEOA cohort or the post-EEOA cohort. The pre-EEOA cohort is defined
to be women aged 18 or older in 1985, the year that the EEOAwas passed;
women in this cohort appear in thefigure above thedasheddiagonal. The
post-EEOA cohort of women is defined to be those who were aged 17 or
younger in 1985; women in this cohort appear below the dashed diagonal.
Our choice of marriage variable—whether a woman is or has been
married by age 32—requires some explanation. Ideally, we would observe
marital status at an older age, because not all women who plan to marry
17 The survey originally contacted 3,623 randomly selected women in this age group, of
whom 1,500 were ultimately selected to be in the first wave of the panel. Demographic char-
acteristics of these participants were comparable to those of the same age group in the pop-
ulation census (Higuchi 2001).






























































will in fact be married by age 32. However, given the construction of the
sample and sample attrition, the later the age at which we observe marital
status, the fewer observations will be available. Further, if we choose to ob-
serve marital status at a later age, the balance between the pre-EEOA and
post-EEOA samples is reduced. Thus, our choice is a pragmatic one: by
observing women at age 32, we capture a large proportion of marriages
while still having a large enough sample size to address our main hypoth-
eses.18
Among our working sample of 2,224, there are 1,985 women for whom
marital status at age 32 can be determined. The difference between these
twonumbers is attributableprimarily to attrition: womenwhohaddropped
out of the sample before age 32 and had not married before dropping out.
The main differences between the subsample for which marital status is
known and the full sample are that the women in the subsample are more
likely to be from pre-EEOA cohorts (the proportions are 0.508 vs. 0.471)
and that they are less likely to have a university education (the proportions
are 0.149 vs. 0.157).19
The variables used in our estimation are defined in table 1. The variables
that do not come from the JPSC are measured at the level of the prefecture
in which the young woman resided as of age 17.20
The variables in xe are similar to those in Edwards and Pasquale (2003)
and include characteristics of the woman’s family background (parents’
educational attainment, family income, whether the young woman at-
tended private high school, her number of siblings, whether she has any
brothers, and whether her mother was primarily a homemaker); proxy
measures of her academic ability (attendance at juku [“cram school”] in el-
ementary [Juku 2], juniorhigh [Juku 3], andhigh school [Juku 4]); proxy
measures for the availability and opportunity costs of university education
inher area asmeasured at her age 17 (the ratio of professors tohigh school
graduates and the vacancy/application ratio); a proxy for the expected re-
turns to university education (the ratio for males of the national average
starting wage for university graduates relative to that of high school grad-
uates); and a dummy variable (EEOA) indicating whether the passage of
the EEOA took place when she was no older than 17 years—the age at
which we assume her final decision with regard to university education
was made. As discussed above, the last variable is included because the
EEOA aimed to increase women’s access to career employment (and the
18 Themean age at firstmarriage for women in Japan over the time period covered in our
data ranged from 25.9 (in 1990) to 28.8 (in 2010; JapanMinistry of Health, Labour andWel-
fare 2015).
19 These differences between the subsample of 1,985 that we use and the total potential
sample of 2,224 have the potential to make our results subject to selection bias. The obser-
vations without marriage information contribute to the likelihood function of education
only.
20 Prefectures in Japan are geographic units that are similar to states in theUnited States.
One variable in table 1 is measured at the national level: the university/high school first-
wage ratio.































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































resulting higher lifetime earnings), and university education is the tradi-
tional route to this type of employment.21
In the case of the marriage equation, the explanatory variables xm repre-
sent factors suggested by the economic and demographic literature sur-
veyed in the previous section. Educational attainment has been found to
be an important determinant of marriage decisions in almost all of the lit-
erature that we surveyed and falls directly out of the Lefgren andMcIntyre
(2006) utilitymaximizationmodel described above; our education dummy
variable indicates whether or not the young woman completed university.
Family background variables such as parents’ income, family structure
(number of siblings and whether there is a male sibling), and whether
the woman’s mother was a full-time homemaker are also commonly used.
To represent the state of the labor market around the time that the young
woman completes her education, a variety of proxies have been used (see
Higuchi 2001; Hashimoto and Kondo 2012; Sakamoto and Kitamura
2007). We use the prefecture vacancy/application ratio at the age she com-
pletes her schooling to proxy the strength of the labor market she faces af-
ter schooling.22 A higher vacancy/application ratio indicates a stronger job
market, which may be positively or negatively related to the probability of
marriage.23 In addition, following Abe (2013), we include two city size var-
iables to proxy the state of the labormarket for university-educatedwomen.
To capture the state of themarriagemarket, we use several variables. The
availability of potential spouses with a level of education equal to or greater
than that of the woman (found to be an important factor by Raymo and
Iwasawa 2005) is computed for each birth cohort for each prefecture as fol-
lows: for women who did not have a university degree, we use the ratio of
the number of (2-years-older)male high school graduates (with or without
a university education) to female high school graduates (without a univer-
sity education); for women who had a university degree, we use the ratio of
the number of (2-years-older) male university graduates to female univer-
sity graduates.24 We expect this variable to be positively related to the
woman’s probability of marriage. The cost of setting up a household is
proxied by rent per tatamimat (in constant yen) in the woman’s prefecture
21 From this point onward, we use “EEOA” in two ways: to refer to the law itself and to
represent the dummy variable that indicates whether each observation is part of a pre-
EEOA cohort (EEOA 5 0) or a post-EEOA cohort (EEOA 5 1). We believe that the appro-
priate interpretation will be clear to the reader from the context.
22 The age at which a woman’s education is completed is assumed to be 18 for a high
school graduate, 21 for a junior college or vocational school graduate, and 23 for a univer-
sity graduate.
23 Miyoshi (2014) and others, noting that a strong labor market affects both a woman’s
expected earning power and the earning power of a potential spouse, refers to the positive
relationship as the “self-reliance effect” and to the negative relationship as the “good-catch
effect.”
24 We construct our proxy measure for spouse availability using men 2 years older than
the womenbecause the average age difference between spouses over the period of our study
ranged from 2.9 years in 1987 to 2.6 in 1992, 2.4 in 1997, 1.7 in 2002, and 1.7 in 2005 (see
National Institute of Population and Social Security Research 2005).
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as of the year she completes her education. The search costs associatedwith
finding a mate and also varying cultural norms regarding marriage are
proxied by the two city size variables mentioned above (Sakai 2009).
To explore the potential impact of the EEOA,we include in themarriage
equation theEEOAdummyvariable, asdefinedabove, aswell as anEEOA
education interaction term. This interaction term enables us to estimate
separateeducationcoefficients forpre- andpost-EEOAcohorts and there-
foreallowsus to test thehypothesis that thepassageof theEEOAincreased
the “deterrent” effect of university education onmarriage.
In addition to these variables, we include in both the education and
marriage equations a set of dummy variables that indicate the geographic
district in which the woman lived when she was aged 17 ( Japan is divided
into 10 such districts).25 These are included to hold constant any district-
specific unmeasured taste, economic, or cultural factors that may affect
education or marriage decisions. Finally, in some specifications, we in-
clude a linear time trend variable. Descriptive statistics for all variables
are shown in table 2. The final two columns of the table indicate whether
the variable appears in the education equation, themarriage equation, or
both. The variables that appear in the education equation but not in the
marriage equation (i.e., those with “Yes” in the first of these columns and
“No” in the second) serve to satisfy the exclusion restrictions for our esti-
mation.
V. Results
In discussing our results, we focus on partial effects rather than probit co-
efficients. Partial effects have the advantageof beingmore readily interpret-
able than probit coefficients, yet share the same sign and, inmost cases, the
same level of statistical significance as the underlying probit coefficients.26
These partial effects, reported in table 3, are shown for our main variables
of interest and for those that are statistically significant in the probit estima-
tion (probit estimates for all variables are reported in tableA1).27 In thefirst
25 It is possible that women will not be living in the same district at the time they make
their marriage decision as when they were age 17, but the JPSC data do not permit us to
identify the district in which each woman lives subsequent to age 17. The 10 districts (called
chiho in Japanese) are Hokkaido, Tohoku, Minami-Kanto, Kita-Kanto and Koshin, Hokuriku,
Tokai, Kinki, Chugoku, Shikoku, and Kyushu.
26 We compute all partial effects by computing them for each observation and then av-
eraging across all observations to yield average partial effects. Standard errors are estimated
via the bootstrapmethod, with 100 replicates clustering at the cohort level. The significance
levels of the partial effects and coefficients may marginally differ.
27 Two findings from our probit estimates in table A1 should be pointed out. First, the
estimated value for the coefficient of correlation between the error terms in the education
andmarriage equations is negative, but small (2.0112) and not statistically significant. This
means that the potential correlation between unmeasured characteristics of the young
woman that affect both education and marriage decisions is not large enough to affect
our estimates. Second, more than half of the district dummy variables (not shown) are sta-
tistically significant, indicating that it is important to include these variables to hold con-
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column of table 3 are the direct partial effects, which pertain to both the
education and marriage equations. In the second column are indirect par-
tial effects, which are relevant only for themarriage equation. The third col-
umn shows the sumof direct and indirect partial effects, again relevant only
for the marriage equation. There are two parts to table 3: panel A contains
partial effects computed from the coefficient estimates of our base model
(as specified in eqq. [1] and [2]), while panelB contains partial effects com-
puted from amodifiedmodel that holds time trends constant, as discussed
below. Recall that partial effects are computed for each variable, holding
constant all other variables, and are therefore not additive.
To get a sense of the scale of these partial effects, it is useful to keep in
mind the level and changes in the prevalence of university education and
marriage across the cohorts in our sample. The percent of women in our
sample with a university education ranged from 11 percent in the earliest
cohort to 24 percent in the final cohort, an increase of 13 percentage
points. Over the same period, the percent of 32-year-olds ever married
ranged from 92 percent in our earliest cohort to 69 percent in the final co-
hort, a decline of 23 percentage points.
TABLE 2








Marriagea .7955 .4035 0 1 No Yes
Completed education .1569 .3638 0 1 Yes Yes
EEOA .5081 .5000 0 1 Yes Yes
Large city .2567 .4369 0 1 No Yes
Mid-sized city .5719 .4949 0 1 No Yes
Rent 2.1539 .9055 .9677 4.7601 No Yes
Spouse availability 1.4212 .4302 .4390 2.7047 No Yes
Vacancy/
applicationMA .8773 .4536 .1200 2.6800 No Yes
Middle income .5423 .4983 0 1 Yes Yes
High income .1529 .3600 0 1 Yes Yes
Mother’s education .0355 .1851 0 1 Yes No
Father’s education .1668 .3729 0 1 Yes No
Private high school .3035 .4599 0 1 Yes No
Homemaker .3381 .4732 0 1 Yes Yes
Number of siblings 2.4622 .9179 1 12 Yes Yes
Having brother(s) .5733 .4947 0 1 Yes Yes
Juku 2 .3651 .4816 0 1 Yes No
Juku 3 .5665 .4957 0 1 Yes No
Juku 4 .1722 .3776 0 1 Yes No
Number of professors .0758 .0598 .0174 .2650 Yes No
Vacancy/applicationED .9071 .4578 .0900 2.6800 Yes No
Univ./HS first-wage
ratio 1.2357 .0364 1.1515 1.4225 Yes No
Note.—See table 1 for definitions of variables.
a Summary statistics computed from the 1985 observations for which marriage data are
available.
stant cross-sectional socioeconomic differences that are not fully captured by the socioeco-
nomic variables included in the analysis.
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A. Base Model
We begin our discussion of table 3, panel A, with the variables that are the
prime focus of this research: EEOA in the education equation and both
EEOA and education in the marriage equation. Looking first at the edu-
cation equation, the partial effect of EEOAon the probability of university
education, while positive, is just under 2 percentage points and is not sta-
tistically significant. Thus, we do not have strong support for our first hy-
pothesis.
In the case of the marriage equation, the partial effect of the EEOA var-
iable is negative, but again is not significantly different from zero (this con-
clusion holds even when the contribution from the indirect effect [third
column] is included). In contrast, the university education variable has a
large partial effect—a negative and significant 20 percentage points. This
estimated partial effect is essentially an average over pre-EEOA and post-
EEOA cohorts. As a consequence, it conceals a crucial finding: it is the in-
teraction between EEOA and education that is the real story here. The
deterrent effect of university education on marriage is doubled after the
passage of the EEOA. To be specific, before the passage of the EEOA, a uni-
versity education is associated with a nonsignificant 12.6 percentage point
reduction in the likelihood that a young woman has married by age 32. Af-
ter the law’s passage, the partial effect is much larger and is statistically sig-
nificant, yielding a 26.7 percentage point reduction in the probability of
marriage.28 Given that in our sample the proportion of 32-year-olds who
have married falls by 23 percentage points over the period in our study,
the magnitude of this partial effect for post-EEOA cohorts is remarkable.
This result clearly supports theproposition that university-educatedwomen
believe that they can best take advantage of the enhanced career options
associated with the passage of the EEOAby delaying or decliningmarriage.
Partial effects of the other variables in the education and marriage equa-
tions, thoughnot the primary focus of our study, are also informative. In the
case of the education equation, it is evident in table 3 that family back-
ground variables play the strongest role in decisions regarding university ed-
ucation. The partial effect ofmother’s education is by far the largest: having
amother with a university education is associatedwith a 23 percentagepoint
higher probability that a young woman herself completes university. Having
a father with a university education is almost as powerful, associated with a
18 percentage point increased likelihood of completing university, as is at-
tending juku in high school, which is associated with a 19 percentage point
increase in the likelihood of completing university. Higher income is also
positively associated with the likelihood of university education, with partial
effects of 9 and 4 percentage points for the high- and middle-income vari-
ables, respectively. Other family background variables that are statistically
significant have lesser partial effects ranging from 2 to 4 percentage points.
28 The difference between these two partial effects is statistically significant, with a p - value
of .050.
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TABLE 3
Partial Effects on Education and Marriage Decisions




Middle income .045*** (.014)
High income .087*** (.023)
Mother’s education .234*** (.061)
Father’s education .180*** (.021)
Private high school 2.033*** (.012)
Number of siblings 2.024** (.010)
Having brother(s) 2.017 (.018)
Juku 3 2.047*** (.014)
Juku 4 .192*** (.021)
Marriage decision:
Completed education 2.200* (.109)
Pre-EEOA 2.126 (.113)
Post-EEOA 2.267** (.109)
EEOA 2.022 (.023) 2.004 (.004) 2.026 (.022)
Middle income .019* (.011) 2.009** (.005) .010 (.011)
High income .008 (.035) 2.018* (.011) 2.010 (.030)
Homemaker 2.016 (.021) 2.006 (.005) 2.022 (.021)
Number of siblings .035** (.015) .005 (.004) .040*** (.015)
Having brother(s) 2.049* (.025) .004 (.003) 2.045* (.025)
Large city 2.063** (.025)
Mid-sized city 2.047* (.026)
Rent 2.049*** (.018)
Vacancy/applicationMA 2.059** (.028)
Mother’s education 2.048 (.030)
Father’s education 2.037** (.016)
Juku 3 .010 (.008)
Juku 4 2.039* (.021)
B. Trend and Trend  Education Interaction Included
Education decision:
EEOA .004 (.032)
Middle income .045*** (.014)
High income .086*** (.023)
Mother’s education .234*** (.061)
Father’s education .179*** (.021)
Private high school 2.033*** (.012)
Number of siblings 2.024** (.010)
Having brother(s) 2.017 (.018)
Juku 3 2.048*** (.015)
Juku 4 .192*** (.021)
Marriage decision:
Completed education 2.119 (.089)
Pre-EEOA .000 (.110)
Post-EEOA 2.195** (.087)
EEOA .088*** (.033) .000 (.005) .087*** (.034)
Middle income .024** (.011) 2.006 (.004) .018 (.011)
High income .009 (.035) 2.011 (.008) 2.001 (.032)
Homemaker 2.022 (.020) 2.003 (.004) 2.025 (.020)
Number of siblings .035** (.015) .003 (.003) .038** (.016)
Having brother(s) 2.051** (.025) .002 (.002) 2.049* (.025)
Large city 2.067*** (.025)
Mid-sized city 2.048* (.026)
In the case of the marriage equation, both direct and indirect partial ef-
fects must be considered. With regard to the direct effects, the single most
important variable, in termsof themagnitudeof thepartial effect, iswhether
the young woman has a university education, as discussed in detail above.
The other statistically significant direct partial effects are smaller. Women
from large cities are 6 percentage points less likely to be married, as com-
pared to those from small cities, and the correspondingdifference is just un-
der 5 percentage points for women from middle-sized cities versus those
from small cities. Thenumber andgender of siblingshave impacts of similar
magnitude: having an additional sibling is associated with about a 3.5 per-
centage point increase in the probability of marriage, while having at least
one brother is associated with about a 5 percentage point decline. The par-
tial effects of the rent and labor market variables are comparable in magni-
tude: a 1-standard-deviation increase in monthly rent (which corresponds
approximately to a 900-yen increase) is associated with about a 4 percentage
point decline in the likelihood of marriage (0:905  ð20:049Þ), and a 1-
standard-deviation increase in the vacancy/application ratio (which we see
from table 2 is 0.454) is associated with a decline of just under 3 percentage
points (0:454  0:059). The direct partial effect of the two income variables
is small and significant only for the middle-income class.
One of the innovations of our study is to explicitly take into account in-
direct effects on marriage of variables that affect university education deci-
sions. In the second column of table 3, we can see that there are statistically
significant indirect effects for the two income variables, father’s education,
and Juku 4. In the case of the two income variables, the indirect effect off-
sets the direct effect, so that the total partial effect of income onmarriage is
no longer statistically significant for the middle-income variable and even
turns negative in the case of the high-income variable (higher income in-
creases the likelihood that a young woman marries, but it also increases
her likelihood of obtaining a university education, which in turn reduces
her likelihood of marriage). In the case of father’s education and Juku 4,
there are indirect partial effects only, and both are statistically significant
and negative: having a father with a university education is associated with
TABLE 3 (Continued)
Direct Effect Indirect Effect Total Effect
Rent 2.036** (.018)
Vacancy/applicationMA 2.059** (.029)
Mother’s education 2.028 (.021)
Father’s education 2.022 (.014)
Juku 3 .006 (.006)
Juku 4 2.023 (.017)
Note.—Estimated effects are reported; bootstrap standard errors with 100 replications, clus-
tering at the cohort level, are in parentheses. See table 1 for definitions of variables.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
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an almost 4 percentage point decline in the likelihood ofmarriage, and be-
ing more able, as reflected in attending juku in high school, is associated
with a decline of 3.7 percentage points.
B. A Robustness Test
We explore one variation of our model. A skeptic could argue that our
results with regard to the relationships among the marriage, education,
and EEOA variables are simply reflecting secular trends in cultural atti-
tudes toward the role of women in society rather than any “cause-and-
effect” relationship among these three variables. Put differently, one
could conjecture that the EEOA variable in both equations and the edu-
cation and education/EEOA interaction variables in the marriage equa-
tion are simply proxies for omitted variables that capture secular changes
in attitudes.29 If this argument were true, a trend variable added to our
estimating equations would be statistically significant and knock out
some or all of the other variables that have monotonic trends. Even if it
were not valid, the potential multicollinearity among the variables with
common trends has the potential to raise the standard errors of coeffi-
cient estimates, reducing their likelihood of statistical significance.
We carry out this demanding robustness test by incorporating a trend var-
iable into our base model. More specifically, we add a trend variable to the
education equation and both a trend variable and a Trend education in-
teraction to ourmarriage equation. This variable (“Trend”) is coded from1
for the oldest cohort in ourdata (those born in 1959) to 18 for the youngest
cohort (born in 1976). The resulting estimates of partial effects appear in
panel B of table 3 (computed from the probit coefficients in panel B of ta-
ble A1).
How are the conclusions that we drew about the interrelationships
among university education, marriage, and the EEOA altered? In the case
of the education decision, adding the trend variable does not cause us to
change our conclusions: the partial effect of the EEOA variable remains
positive, shrinks in value, and is still not statistically significant. Thus, our
initial finding remains unchanged: the EEOA does not appear to have sig-
nificantly increased young women’s propensity to obtain a university edu-
cation.
In the case of the marriage decision, our main finding—that the deter-
rent effect of university education on marriage is much greater for post-
EEOA cohorts than for pre-EEOA cohorts—remains unchanged. However,
29 An alternative way of casting this argument is to say that the EEOA is an endogenous
variable, a result of these changing attitudes. While changing attitudes within Japan un-
doubtedly played a role, this is a case where exogenous forces were at work: it was widely
recognized at the time the act was under discussion that Japan felt some pressure, as a sig-
natory of the 1980 United Nations Convention Concerning the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women, to pass legislation that would put it into compliance with
this convention.
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the inclusion of the Trend and Trend  education interaction variables,
both of which have statistically significant probit coefficients, does change
some of the other estimated partial effects. The estimated partial effect of
university education onmarriage is reduced (in absolute value) for both co-
hort groupings separately and for the entire period taken as a whole. To be
specific, the pre-EEOA partial effect of education was reduced to virtually
zero (from 20.126), the post-EEOA negative partial effect declines (from
20.267 to20.195) but is still statistically significant, and the negative partial
effect of education taken over the entire period declines (from 20.200 to
20.119) and is no longer statistically significant. Despite these changes,
the results still confirm our earlier finding that the deterrent effect of uni-
versity education marriage is greatly increased after the passage of the
EEOA. Indeed, the difference in partial effects between post-EEOA cohorts
and pre-EEOA cohorts is larger in this specification (20:195 2 0:000 5
20:195) than in our base specification (20:267 2 ð20:126Þ 5 20:141).
The issue of the statistical significance of these differences is pursued in
the next subsection, in which we interpret our model in the context of a
“difference-in-differences” framework.
Two other results in panel B of table 3merit discussion.30 First, the partial
effect of the EEOA variable on the marriage decision is now positive and
statistically significant. Specifically, ceteris paribus, post-EEOA cohorts have
an 8.8 percentage point higher probability of being married by age 32, as
compared with pre-EEOA cohorts. We do not have an explanation for
why the EEOA would have encouraged marriage, but we do have a poten-
tial explanation for this finding. Around the same time that the EEOA was
passed, there were two other pieces of legislation that affected after-tax in-
come of married women: the “Special Tax Exemption for Spouses,” intro-
duced in 1985, and the “Exemption from National Pension Premiums for
Spouses (Category III Insured Persons),” introduced in 1987.31 These two
policy changes effectively reduced the “marriage penalty” for working
women with low earnings, thereby reducing their opportunity cost of mar-
riage and potentially increasing their likelihood of marriage.32
30 Except for the partial effects discussed in the text, the other partial effects in panel B
are very similar to those in panel A.
31 The “Special Tax Exemption for Spouses” and the “Exemption fromNational Pension
Premiums for Spouses (Category III Insured Persons)” are Haigusha-Tokubestu-Kojo and
Daisango-Hihokenja in Japanese, respectively.
32 These two legislative changes are family-based, income-tested tax credits, so they are
likely to have had a greater proportionate positive impact on the effective after-tax earnings
of women with lower potential earnings (women who worked part-time or, if they worked
full-time, did not have a university education) than on those of womenwith higher potential
earnings (university graduates who worked full-time). If so, it is possible that our estimated
post-EEOA increase in the negative partial effect of university education on marriage is
caused in part by the coincident change in tax law. To determine the importance of this pos-
sibility, we do a “back-of-the-envelope” calculation to estimate the likely order of magnitude
of the effect of the change in the tax treatment of married women’s earnings on their mar-
riage propensity by using existing estimates of the elasticity of women’smarriage propensity
with regard to their own after-tax earnings, combined with the change in effective after-tax
income implied by the two tax laws. We compute an upper-limit estimate by assuming that
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Second, none of the indirect partial effects in the marriage equation
are statistically significant in panel B. This finding follows directly from
the fact that the partial effect of university education on marriage is re-
duced in panel B, necessarily reducing (in absolute value) the resultant
indirect partial effect.
In sum, this robustness test confirms our earlier findings of no significant
effect of the EEOA on university education decisions and of a significantly
greater deterrent effect of university education on marriage after the pas-
sage of the EEOA.33 It also reveals a positive partial effect of the EEOA
on marriage, but we believe that this is likely the result of a coincident
change in the tax laws that applied to the earnings of married women.
C. A “Difference-In-Differences” (DID) Model
Another way to look at the results of our analysis is by applying a DIDmeth-
odology. This methodology typically looks at the effect on a particular out-
come of a “treatment” on a specified group before and after the treatment,
only women without a university education would have had their effective after-tax earnings
affected by this change in tax law. The resulting estimate is 5 percentage points (details of
the calculation are available from the authors upon request). That is, at most 5 percentage
points of the post-EEOA education differential in predicted marriage rates would be asso-
ciated with the change in tax laws. Further, if university-educated women have earnings that
are low enough to be eligible for the tax reduction (e.g., because they work part-time), this
estimate would be even smaller. Since the pre- versus post-EEOA difference in estimated
partial effects from panels A and B of table 3 are 20.141 and 20.195, respectively, even if
the portion of this difference attributable to the change in tax law is asmuch as 5 percentage
points, our paper’s conclusions would not be altered.
33 We perform an alternative robustness test in response to a reviewer’s request. Recall
that our specification of the cohorts to be affected by the EEOA includes young women who
were age 17 or younger when the act was passed in 1985—our reasoning was that post–high
school education plans would already have been made for women aged 18 or older at that
time. The reviewer suggested, however, that women who were aged 18–21 in 1985 might
have been able to alter their post–high school education plans upon learning of the passage
of the act and suggested that as a “robustness test” we also estimate a version of our model
that includes these four age cohorts in the post-EEOA group rather than in the pre-EEOA
group. We conduct this test, recomputing the estimates in panel A of table 3 by using a re-
vised definition of the EEOA dummy variable to reflect the recommended changes. Given
that the four cohorts being shifted from the pre-EEOA group to the post-EEOA group are
less likely to have been affected by the passage of the act, we expected that the partial effects
computed from the coefficients in the education and marriage equations of the revised
EEOA variable (denoted “EEOA-rev”) and any relevant interactions to decline in absolute
value. For the most part, this is what we find. In the education equation, the partial effect of
EEOA-rev is 0.007 (vs. 0.019 in table 3) and remains statistically nonsignificant. In the mar-
riage equation, the partial effect of university education for pre-EEOA-rev cohorts remains
about the same (20.129 vs.20.126 in table 3), but for post-EEOA-rev cohorts it falls in ab-
solute value, to 20.211 (vs. 20.267 in table 3). There is one exception to this general pat-
tern: in the marriage equation, the partial effect of EEOA-rev is a statistically significant
20.076, whereas the corresponding partial effect in table 3 is just 20.022 and nonsignifi-
cant. Overall, the conclusion that we draw from this robustness test is that the expansion
in the definition of post-EEOA cohorts does not appreciably alter our main conclusions re-
garding the EEOA: the finding of no significant effect on education decisions remains un-
changed, and the finding of lower predictedmarriage rates by age 32 for post-EEOA univer-
sity graduates (as compared to women without a university education) remains, though the
differential is reduced.
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using an untreated group as the control. In the context of our research, the
outcome would be marriage by age 32, the treatment group is university
graduates, the untreated (control) group is women without a university
degree, and treatment period is the post-EEOA period. Figure 3 illustrates
this structure by graphing marriage rates for university graduates and non–
university graduates in our sample over the study period. The data are pre-
sented as three-cohortmoving averages (graphed at themiddle cohort), be-
cause, with micro data such as these and the relatively small sample size for
each cohort, there is substantial random variation.34 Evident in this figure
are the findings that we have highlighted above: that university-educated
women have lower marriage rates than not-university-educated women
and that this difference increases after the passage of the EEOA.
Figure 3 also illustrates why it is reasonable to treat themarriage patterns
of not-university-educated women as a “control” group for a DID analysis:
we see that the downward trend in marriage rates for university-educated
women and not-university-educated women are roughly parallel before
the passage of the EEOA. The parallel trend indicates that the common-
trend assumption is met in our study. Also relevant is the fact that the cor-
relation between the unobserved determinants of education and marriage
decisions is small and not statistically significant (see table A1). That is, the
selection into treatment can be considered exogenous. Together, these two
Figure 3.—Marriage rates by educational status (three-cohort moving average): three-cohort
average including previous and subsequent cohorts. For cohorts 9 and 10, only the average
of the eighth and ninth cohorts and that of tenth and eleventh cohorts, respectively, are used.
34 Note also that because we are using three-cohortmoving averages, (1) there is no entry
for the first or last cohort and (2) for the last cohort of the pre-EEOA period (cohort 9) and
the first cohort of the post-EEOA period (cohort 10), only two-cohort averages are used.
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factors suggest that we can use a DID model to examine whether it is rea-
sonable to interpret our findings as reflecting a “causal” effect onmarriage
decisions of the EEOA via the increased deterrent effect of university edu-
cation in the post-EEOA period.
We use the probit estimates in table A1 to carry out this test. We have
already computed separate partial effects of education on marriage for
the pre- and post-EEOA cohorts (see table 3). In the context of a linear
regression model, the difference between these two partial effects could
be interpreted as the DID estimator of the “average treatment effect on
the treated,” that is, the differential effect of university education onmar-
riage in the post-EEOA period. In the context of a nonlinear model such
as ours, however, the DID estimator is more complicated; this sim-
ple cross difference does not yield this parameter of interest (Puhani
2012). In a probit model, the DID estimator is Fðg 1 am 1 v 1 xm 0bmÞ
2 Fðg 1 am 1 xm 0bmÞ.35
The resulting DID estimators appear in table 4. Both estimates are neg-
ative and statistically significant, confirming our earlier findings that the
negative effect of university education on marriage is substantially larger
after the passage of the EEOA, with the differential ranging from 13 to
21 percentage points, depending on which specification is preferred.
VI. Conclusions
Prompted by declines in Japanese birth rates and marriage rates over the
past 30 years, this paper seeks to understand how women’s declining pro-
pensity tomarry interacts with the growth over the same period inwomen’s
propensity to attenduniversity andhowbothof these trendsmay have been
affected by the passage in 1985 of the Japanese EEOA. Using data from a
TABLE 4
Difference-in-Differences (DID) Estimation Results
Base Model Model Including Trend
DID estimate 2.1355* (.0726) 2.2110** (.0833)
Note.—Bootstrap standard errors with 100 replications, clustering at the
cohort level, are in parentheses.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
35 Our model is slightly different from a standard DIDmodel, as we allow for self-selection
into E by employing the bivariate probit model. However, conditioning on E, the expectation
ofM canbeexpressed in the bivariatemodel in the sameway as in a single probitmodel.More-
over, as reported in tableA1, r is not statistically significantly different fromzero, and thus, the
bivariate probit model is statistically equivalent to two separate single probit models. Indeed,
we also compute the DID estimate, as well as other partial effects, on the basis of the single
probit model. The results are almost the same as those we report in table 4. Since we estimate
the “average treatment effect on the treated,” the expression above is averaged among obser-
vations with E 5 1 and A 5 1, that is, those who completed a university education and are in
the post-EEOA period.
288 Journal of Human Capital
unique Japanese panel survey, the JPSC, we estimate amodel that treats ed-
ucation andmarriagedecisions as jointly, thoughnot simultaneously, deter-
mined. Specifically, we use a recursive bivariate probit econometric model
to capture the particular context within which education andmarriage de-
cisions are made in Japan.
What areour conclusions? First, a youngwoman’s decisionwith regard to
university education is determined primarily by her parents’ education and
income, by the young woman’s ability, and by her family’s structure. The
passage of the EEOA does not appear to have had an important effect.
Second, it is clear that young women’s decisions with regard to univer-
sity education and marriage are closely interlinked. The single most im-
portant variable among those we study in determining whether a woman
ismarried by age 32 is whether shehas a university education.Notably, this
linkage is found to be strongest for post-EEOA cohorts. Specifically, for
pre-EEOA cohorts, university-educated women are estimated to be at
most 13 percentage points less likely to be married by age 32, compared
to their less-educated contemporaries, but this estimate is not statistically
significant. In contrast, for post-EEOA cohorts, we see a strikingly large,
statistically significant negative partial effect of university education onmar-
riage by age 32, with point estimates from 219 to 227 percentage points.
This larger post-EEOA differential effect of university education on mar-
riage is also evident in our DID analysis.
Third, our analysis pinpoints other socioeconomic factors that signifi-
cantly affect marriage decisions by age 32, though to a lesser extent than
university education. Marriage is less likely for women who live in large
or middle-sized cities or who have a male sibling. In contrast, having addi-
tional siblings (holding their sex constant) is associated with a higher like-
lihood of marriage. The role of the labor market is similar to that reported
by other researchers: when the vacancy/application rate is higher and jobs
more plentiful, women are less likely to be married by age 32. Also, when
the cost of setting up a marital home, as reflected by average rental costs,
is higher, women are less likely to be married by that age. The passage of
the EEOAdoes not appear to have had an important impact in and of itself
but rather operates by increasing the responsiveness of the marriage deci-
sion to university education, as described above.
At the beginning of this paper, we set out three hypotheses: (1) the pas-
sageof theEEOA,by expanding career opportunities of university-educated
women, increased the proportion of qualified women who follow this edu-
cational path; (2) the expanded career opportunities associatedwithuniver-
sity education influence women’smarriage decisions, leading them to delay
or declinemarriage; and (3) the passage of the EEOA (and subsequent sup-
porting legislation), which changed the legal and cultural landscape to
make a career path more socially and economically attractive to women, in-
creased the “deterrent” effect of university education on marriage. In the
case of our first hypothesis, our evidence about the role of the EEOA in uni-
versity education decisions does not provide unambiguous support. It may
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be that some young women chose other paths not studied here, like voca-
tional training, as the avenue for taking advantage of the opportunities af-
fording by the EEOA. In the case of the second and third hypotheses, we
find that women who were university educated had a lower probability of
being married by the age of 32, as compared to otherwise similar women,
and that, most notably, the deterrent effect of university education was sig-
nificantly greater for post-EEOA cohorts than for their predecessors. Over-
all, our research strongly suggests that the Japanese EEOA and the expan-
sion in career opportunities it made available to university-educated women
was a contributory factor in the delay and decline over the past 30 years
of marriage in Japan.
Appendix
. Results of Bivariate Probit Estimation
TABLE A1
Estimation Results: Bivariate Probit Model of Completed
Education and Marital Status
A. Base Model
B. Model Including Trend and Trend 
Education Interaction
Education equation:
EEOA .1004 (.0925) .0196 (.1323)
Trend .0109 (.0145)
Middle income .2536*** (.0844) .2519*** (.0845)
High income .4484*** (.1011) .4453*** (.1006)
Mother education .8870*** (.1760) .8861*** (.1761)
Father education .7402*** (.0783) .7383*** (.0792)
Private high school 2.1790** (.0742) 2.1780** (.0739)
Homemaker .1393 (.0927) .1441 (.0941)
Number of siblings 2.1263** (.0499) 2.1266** (.0498)
Having brother(s) 2.0914 (.0915) 2.0885 (.0931)
Juku 2 2.0796 (.0763) 2.0793 (.0763)
Juku 3 2.2463*** (.0656) 2.2527*** (.0699)
Juku 4 .7910*** (.0634) .7911*** (.0634)
Number of professors .3074 (.4301) .3004 (.4422)
Vacancy/applicationED 2.1007 (.0977) 2.1208 (.1041)
Univ./HS first-wage ratio .2876 (1.4191) .0388 (1.4809)
Constant 21.8586 (1.7506) 21.6018 (1.8018)
Marriage equation:
Completed education 2.4256 (.3133) 2.4773 (.3478)
EEOA .0022 (.1102) .4719*** (.1168)
Education  EEOA 2.3940** (.2005) 2.6949*** (.2669)
Trend 2.0649*** (.0117)
Education  Trend .0456* (.0270)
Middle income .0710 (.0444) .0877* (.0459)
High income .0305 (.1369) .0338 (.1345)
Homemaker 2.0606 (.0783) 2.0795 (.0761)
Number of siblings .1327** (.0553) .1317** (.0570)
Having brother(s) 2.1841** (.0917) 2.1913** (.0913)
Large city 2.2449** (.1040) 2.2586** (.1049)
Mid-sized city 2.1851 (.1154) 2.1881 (.1162)
Rent 2.1831** (.0769) 2.1337* (.0731)
Spouse availability 2.3302*** (.1239) 2.0320 (.1381)
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TABLE A1 (Continued)
A. Base Model
B. Model Including Trend and Trend 
Education Interaction
Vacancy/applicationMA 2.2213** (.1124) 2.2207* (.1188)
Constant 1.3376*** (.2688) 1.2531*** (.2835)
r 2.0112 (.1811) 2.001 (.181)
Observations 2,224 2,224
Log likelihood 21,719.1221 21,711.0866
Note.—Coefficients (standard error) are reported. Standard errors are clustered at the co-
hort level. See table 1 for definitions of variables. Both education and marriage equations
also contain the district dummy variables.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
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